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Freedom above the Law: Friedrich Schiller’s Die Räuber 
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyze one of the most problematic works of the German 
poet and philosopher, Friedrich Schiller: his first play, Die Räuber (The Robbers, 1782). Following 
Hammer and Hart’s Gadamerian literary hermeneutics, I will focus on the subversive role that 
Schiller attaches to the figure of the criminal in this work. 
Written seven years before the French Revolution, the play has traditionally been interpreted 
as a pre-revolutionary drama that stresses the emancipatory power of the Enlightenment and the 
Revolution. The way in which Schiller appears to use the dichotomy between criminal and society 
supports this view: the noble criminal opposes the Law as the incarnation of a severe and narrow 
rationalism. However, the shared tragic end of the Moor brothers, the protagonists of the play, 
proves the enlightened emancipation to be fallible and reveals its inner despotic potential. This is 
not due to the final retrograde meaning or because the play is not intimately concerned with 
freedom and individual autonomy. Instead, its ultimate aim is not to be propagandistic, or even 
constructive, but harshly critical, uncovering and bearing witness to the oppressive character of 
Schiller’s contemporary society and its public (penal system) and private (family) institutions. 
Subverting the traditional association between criminal-evil/compliant-good and virtue-
recompense/vice-punishment, Schiller breaks up with the retributive logic on which he does not 
rely, as if it were a kind of unrecognized superstition that undermines autonomous thinking and 
action. Through this reversal, Schiller exposes the irrational bases of the retributive urge rooted in 
Christian humanism, which is not founded upon true justice but upon vengeance and the 
heteronomy of transcendent concepts that cannot support an autonomous moral. 
The aim of this essay is to analyze one of the most controversial works of 
the German poet and philosopher, Friedrich Schiller: his first play, The 
Robbers (1782). Following Hammer and Hart’s Gadamerian literary 
hermeneutics, I will focus on the subversive role that Schiller attaches to the 
figure of the criminal in this work. As Schillerian drama can be seen as a 
practice exploring the possibility of real freedom, this essay will also 
investigate crime and human suffering. 
Almost every Schillerian protagonist could be interpreted as a criminal 
figure in a certain way: from a socio-political point of view, like the figures 
analyzed here, to a gender view, even in terms of the pre-Marxian class conflict. 
We are aware that none of Schiller’s characters is finally punished despite their 
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criminality because, in his drama, the common link between crime and 
punishment, paradigmatically exemplified by the Kantian “He has murdered so 
he must die” (Kant 90), is just a ritual of retribution that oversimplifies the deeds 
of the criminal who, in his anti-social dimension, can be understood as a creative 
and free personality. In fact, and aesthetically speaking, the criminal role is the 
best portrayer of freedom. While Schiller did not develop this theory in his 
studies on tragedy and the idea of the sublime1 until several years later, its roots 
could probably be found in the play’s explicit engagement with criminality. 
However, crime is not easy to distinguish here, inasmuch as particular deeds 
bear the label of recognizable crimes but they are committed by agents we are 
not aimed to identify as criminals. In that sense, we can define The Robbers as a 
complex critique of the dichotomy between criminality and compliance by 
means of a pair of false doubles: the two Moor brothers, which reverses the 
traditional linkage between compliance and goodness and between criminality 
and evilness (Hammer, Sublime Crime 80). 
The play starts with a clash between those two brothers: Karl, the good 
elder brother, and Franz, the evil younger brother, who wants to rule over his 
father’s domain even if it means killing both his father and brother. Karl, who 
had left home in order to be released from social constraints, now wants to 
return as a prodigal son to his fatherland and to his beloved, Amalia. However, 
Franz deceives their father, making him think that Karl has become a bandit 
without honour. When Karl thinks he has been rejected by his father, also 
duped by Franz’s letter, he becomes a real robber, committing the most dreadful 
crimes that can be imagined, along with his gang to whom he swears total 
loyalty. Meanwhile, Franz has obtained the absolute power he had longed for 
by means of a ploy. He locks his father up but announces his death to 
everybody, becoming the father’s inheritor in the absence of his criminalized 
brother. Finally, horrified by his band’s and his own crimes, Karl decides to 
return home disguised as a count. Not only does he discover that his father is 
still alive but he also learns about Franz’s conspiracy and orders his comrades 
to capture his brother alive. Franz commits suicide before the robbers can find 
him. Although it seems that the lovers, Karl and Amalia, could finally be 
reunited, the robbers’ gang reminds their chief of the allegiance oath he had 
made. In order to remain loyal to his comrades, Karl kills Amalia, also rushing 
his father’s real death. The play ends tragically when Karl surrenders and turns 
himself in to the civil authorities. 
                                                                
1 Cf. Schiller’s “Über den Grund des Vergnügens an tragischen Gegenstanden” (1792), 
“Vom Erhabenen (Zur western Ausführung einiger kantischen Ideen)” (1793–1794) and “Über das 
Erhabene” (1801). 
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Metaphysics versus Politics 
Despite the complexity of the play, which includes several different plots, 
the focus on criminality provides a concrete perspective that takes account of a 
possible rebellion against social order, autonomous thinking and action. The 
rupture between crime and penal punishment in the social and institutional 
linkage also implies a new understanding of Christianity as an object of derision. 
Firstly, it is because the practices of Christian morality and the effective personal 
action are totally inimical to each other within fictional societies. Secondly, the 
insistence on the practical efficacy of criminal against compliant deeds reverses 
the traditional connection between metaphysics and politics, a reversal which is 
fundamental in Schiller’s general thought. The first must not only cede to 
politics but also admit its essentially political groundings (Hammer, Sublime 
Crime 80). By doing this, Schiller exposes his doubts concerning the moral 
foundation grounded in the metaphysical and heavenly. He also establishes a 
relationship between doubts surrounding the theoretical context of man’s self-
determination and destination. 
We can possibly find the roots of these doubts in Schiller’s Karlsschule 
years. Despite his desire to become a theologian, Schiller was forced by Duke 
Karl Eugen to study medicine. The despotism of this educational institution is 
one of the most important fields of the subsequent Schillerian aesthetic, social 
and political theory, and of his drama practice. His characters always defy the 
prevailing order: an order that criminalizes, imposes exile and makes self-
realization impossible. 
In fact, once Schiller had written The Robbers, he was compelled by the 
Duke not to write anymore under the penalty of exile: “If you dare to write any 
more plays, you shall be broke,” the Duke said to him (qtd. in Dewhurst and 
Reeves 73). However, it was not the corrosive and rebellious content of the play 
that provoked Schiller’s punishment but the mere fact of writing. In this sense, 
Schiller’s preference for criminal protagonists is obviously related to his theory 
of the tragedy and the sublime but also to his own criminalization as an author. 
In biographical terms, we could describe this feature as a symptomatic response 
to the harsh discipline the young Schiller suffered in the Karlsschule, planned 
almost like a modern penal institution  (Hart 18–21). 
As an Enlightened despot, Karl Eugen saw himself as a father to his people. 
His condemnation stamped Schiller’s writing as an act of transgression against 
the Father and Fatherland, making Schiller not a revolutionary but a traitor 
(Hammer, Schiller’s Wound 48). Schiller himself declares so in his report of the 
play: “The play cost me the family and the fatherland” (“Ankündigung” 77). In 
this sense, the daily and deep experience of absolutism probably inspired 
Schiller’s notion of freedom as a supreme spiritual, intellectual and moral value  
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(Beiser 14–15). In fact, freedom is also a supreme aesthetic value and the main 
aim of tragedy is nothing but the self-awareness of freedom as a power to act as 
responsible agents, regardless of any external motive (Beiser 239). This means 
that the tragic hero must not be good to gain our admiration, because what we 
admire is his or her freedom; in tragedy, freedom prevails over morals. Hence, 
what Schiller sought to produce in the audience with The Robbers was to horrify 
as well as to enrapture them, forcing them to identify with its outlaw characters: 
a shattering of enthusiasm that could produce in the public the revolutionary 
dissolution of all the petrified certainties of civil life. Buchwald quotes an eye-
witness’s testimony of the rapture of the audience in the first performance of the 
play in January 1782: 
 
The theatre was like bedlam, with rolling eyes, shaking fists and hoarse cries in the 
auditorium. Strangers embraced one another in tears, women staggered towards the exit on 
the point of swooning. There was a universal commotion like in Chaos, and from its mists 
was born a new Creation. (qtd. in Dewhurst and Reeves 69–70) 
Revolution and Self-criticism 
Written seven years before the French Revolution, the play has usually been 
interpreted as a pre-revolutionary drama seeking to stress the emancipatory 
power of the Enlightenment and the Revolution. The way in which Schiller 
appears to use the dichotomy between criminal and society supports this view: 
the noble criminal who opposes himself to the Law as the incarnation of a severe 
and narrow rationalism  (Reinhold 193). From this perspective, the main aim of 
Schiller’s play would be to provide a proof that the fight of the free criminal 
against the feudal society and the church would remake our socio-political world 
following the enlightened precepts of freedom, goodness, perfection, truth and 
justice. 
However, it is precisely the stress of this kind of precepts or high values that 
gives us the key to the real issues of the play: the limits of these ideals. What 
Schiller exposes in The Robbers is the impossible application of the ideal to 
reality without the suffering or even destruction of the latter and the corruption 
of the former. Therefore the play proves the enlightened emancipation to be 
fallible and reveals its inner despotic potential. 
We bear witness to the failure of the initially good and free criminal Karl 
Moor, who not only destroys his dreams of social perfection and freedom but 
also kills his fiancée, Amalia. But we must notice that, finally, it is the 
antagonist of the play, Karl’s evil but compliant brother Franz, who, despite all 
his cynicism and cruel failed ambition, proves to be more consistent and loyal to 
himself and to the decisions he has made than the formerly noble Karl. 
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This tragic end does not mean a final impugnation of freedom or individual 
autonomy. Schiller did not try to overcome the enlightened project but to 
radicalize it. Even so, at this early stage of his thought, this radicalization may 
have been unconscious, or at least not systematic. As Faustino Oncina says: 
 
The Enlightenment not only underestimated men’s violence but also its own. Why did a 
space of freedom turn into a bloodthirsty settling of scores? Schiller surmises the scandal of 
authoritarian freedom; the fact that the same freedom lodges a moment of violence as soon 
as, provided with power, it goes straight through life and carries out its ideals. Schiller’s 
idealism would be tragic in a certain manner. The hero creates, in the name of his ideals, a 
reality that finally devours him. (71; my translation) 
 
Thus, this is a play about individual autonomy. It depicts the collision 
between an individual seeking his autonomy and society and its institutional 
figures, represented here by the Father and the world of the family. The play 
exposes the collision of such autonomy with heteronymous instances like the 
prevailing moral or metaphysical system. The freedom of choice must triumph 
even over such ideals as the Good, the Justice or the Freedom itself as an ideal. 
Karl fails to be totally free precisely because he is not independent of those 
ideals that here work not as mere heuristic values but as dogmatic devices that 
short-circuit the autonomy of the character. Laura Anna Macor wittingly notes 
that, in the final scene of The Robbers, the supposedly virtuous deed of doing 
honour to the robber’s oath means to Karl not only the loss of his beloved, but 
also the absolute loss of the possibility to behave autonomously (84). As Karl 
himself recognizes: “Should I, then, carry on hiding, as if it were a robbery, a 
life that according to the celestial judges, does not belong to me anymore?” 
(5.2.153). 
This emphasis on individual autonomy and the possibility of its loss is 
precisely what breaks up with any social, political or moral conception founded 
upon retributive justice. In a 1786 poem, “Resignation,” Schiller insisted on  
this idea: 
 
Let him enjoy, who has no faith; eterne 
As earth, this truth!-Abstain, who faith can learn! 
The world’s long history is the world’s own doom. 
 
Hope thou hast felt,-thy wages, then, are paid; 
Thy faith ‘twas formed the rapture pledged to thee. 
Thou might’st have of the wise inquiry made,- 
The minutes thou neglectest, as they fade, 
Are given back by no eternity! (Schiller, Poesía 158)2 
                                                                
2 The original version of this poem was published in the second volume of the Thalia review 
in 1786. 
Lucía Bodas Fernández 
 
50 
This means that neither a celestial recompense nor an infernal punishment 
could be understood as the ultimate incentive of action because they constitute a 
heteronymous purpose for the virtuous behaviour. Our temporal existence can be 
judged only from temporal values, not imposing over it transcendental standards. 
Schiller’s main worry at this moment is to guarantee and protect the autonomy 
of virtue from any external reference, whether worldly or celestial, that could be 
detrimental to its purity (Macor 69). This means that, in a way, it is better to 
behave in a morally reprehensible way but because of an autonomous choice 
than to be virtuous in order to obtain a further recompense of any kind or 
because of the threat of a terrible (moral or religious) punishment. 
Initially unproblematic freedom is one of the reasons for Schiller’s 
preference for criminal characters. In fact, in one of his Philosophy of History 
writings, Schiller reminds us that the original crime of man against God was the 
first manifestation of freedom (Schiller, Escritos 64). Even God is absent in this 
play – God as a father who judges, rewards and punishes, as his existence may 
be used as an alibi for any action, restricting and compromising autonomous will 
and freedom. 
Both Karl and Franz are rebels against such God and his manifestations 
through civil institutions, although not in the same manner. On the one hand, 
Karl breaks up with the Law in order to be free. On the other hand, through his 
evil thirst of destruction and power, Franz exposes the emotional emptiness of 
father-love under patriarchy. However, despite Franz’s invocation of the 
materialistic ethics of self-interest, he does not act out the desire to do evil per se 
but rather from a feeling of personal injustice: “She [his mother] gave me 
nothing. What I become is my own task. We [he and his brother] have the same 
rights” (1.1.42). Franz claims his recognition as a full person by the father, who 
seems to love only Karl. In Hammer’s view, Franz’s lonely rebellion against his 
father represents an attempt to reject and circumvent patriarchy and the 
contradictory values it incarnates (Sublime Crime 91). 
As already suggested, Franz proves to be more subversive than Karl does. 
He represents all that has been deeply repressed within authoritarian society. 
Franz wants to be recognized. Deprived of mother and ignored by father, he is 
never acknowledged as a full person in the play. In contrast, Karl stands to be 
both the literal and figurative inheritor of patriarchal power (Hammer, Schiller’s 
Wound 41) and virtue begins to melt into vice. Karl is both the ultimate hero as 
well as the ultimate murderer. In the same manner, Franz is the ultimate villain 
and the ultimate victim. In the case of Karl, evil is produced by virtue itself, by 
the most beautiful, pure and innocent: the same desire for perfection (Villacañas 
189). However, Karl can neither love nor tolerate the destruction he has 
produced, and he cannot assume responsibility for it. In his view, the hero Karl 
has forged a pure world that inexorably crashes with his own real world, where 
he finds both what he loves and what he despises. This movement forces Karl 
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both to confine himself in his own identity and to spurn a great part of it 
(Villacañas 196). Franz, on the other hand, is fully consistent with himself and 
with his decisions until his own end. He commits suicide but surrenders neither 
to God nor to the Devil. He never regrets the evil he has done because it was his 
evil, a decision he has made in order to achieve an end he has consciously 
elaborated. 
Franz avoids his final condemnation when he denies the father’s judgement 
as providential and affirms his own existence as fortuitous. Erasing all teleology, 
he grounds civilian morality not in metaphysical terms but in political, social and 
temporal ones. Franz is also capable of exceptional acts: he thinks he is guilty of 
patricide and fratricide, which, according to the Christian law, are the greatest of 
sins. In this sense, he is warned by his confessor: the crime that he thinks he has 
perpetrated is one that “men neither commit nor forgive it” (5.1.141). However, 
Franz still keeps on claiming the uniqueness of his crime precisely because he is 
seeking true recognition: “I have not been a vulgar murderer” (5.1.143). It does 
not matter to him whether he is distinguished as the worst of murderers as long 
as he is finally recognized. Karl, however, loses all he has been, his great 
criminality, when he denies all he has previously done surrendering to the civil 
order, unable to maintain justice and social equilibrium. 
Schiller needed the charisma of crime to explore the kinds of great deeds 
that challenge order and define great man. According to Hart: 
 
The Robbers completely undermines the ideal symmetry or economy of crime and 
punishment by obfuscating crime and excluding the appropriate penal agencies. Even where 
minor figures are apprehended and held for legal punishment, this punishment is not applied 
in an adequately retributive or deterrent manner. (65) 
 
This means that, to Schiller, penal law is not valid as a social regulator.  
A terrible injustice is done by killing an innocent man instead of the real bandit 
at the only moment of the play when penal law is at work (2.3.76). The 
retributive apparatus betrays its own aim, namely, to defend social justice and 
equilibrium, as soon as it starts to work according to Schiller 
We find that the greatness of individual autonomy finally prevails over all 
punishing power through indifference to punishment in Schiller’s play. There are 
no “great punishments” that could measure up to these great crimes. In the case 
of the tortured Karl, greatness is his own punishment (Hart 68). In the case of 
Franz, he is a victim of himself: a victim of the coherence of his cynicism and 
wickedness. As Hart says: 
 
In practice, Schiller treated crime as a fascinating intervention into social symmetry that was 
not to be diminished by a rebalancing punishment. The fiction and the drama resist the 
restoration of (bourgeois) equilibrium, and tend to establish the exceptional disruption as a 
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manifestation of the courage, strategic intelligence or “greatness” that humans are 
capable of. (119) 
 
Schiller does not acknowledge punishment as inherently linked to crime or 
to its prevention. In fact, penal practices can be understood as a residue of a 
corrupt system, and to be faithful to them remains a kind of unrecognized 
superstition (Hart 67). However, in a certain sense, the dogmatic belief in the 
feasibility of absolute perfection exemplified by Karl implies another kind of 
superstition. Thus, the Karl-Franz pair is a set of false doubles and the 
dogmatism of enlightened ideals is a kind of false antagonism of the impositions 
of the corrupt system. 
This is one of the reasons why neither brother succeeds in being free. Karl 
and Franz undertake the process of their emancipation from a wrong base. Karl 
swears his allegiance to the robbers’ band (1.2.57), which implies total 
alienation of the capacity of his emancipation (Macor 84) as it represents the 
dogmatism of idealism. On the other hand, the process of Franz’s emancipation 
and recognition fails because it is not founded upon his will for freedom but 
upon his megalomaniac and selfish desire for control over all. 
Schiller depicts a very powerful critique – in fact, an auto-critique – of 
potential degenerations of the Enlightenment. It exposes the crash of the 
materialistic philosophy personified by Franz Moor which cannot produce the 
liberation of anyone, even of its portrayer, who loses himself in a labyrinth of 
loneliness. It also shows the collapse of idealism in the sense embodied by Karl: 
political excesses of abstraction as well as the coldness and emptiness of 
universality, prefiguring fatal mistakes caused seven years later by similar 
dogmatism of the French Revolution. Schiller’s aim is to stress the impossibility 
of obtaining freedom by means of the mere empire of the Law, because it 
confuses the conflict with the concrete. 
Through the dual fates of the Moor brothers Schiller exposes the insidious 
power of an authoritarian regime that perpetuates its injustice through 
individuals. He shows a society locked up in a process of self-destruction, a 
society itself that is criminal. Thus, we are presented with another pair of false 
doubles: a compliant society is as hazardous as a criminal one. The home and 
the family, that is, the private sphere of life, are as dangerous as the robbers’ 
allegiance in the public sphere as they both replicate oppressive mechanisms of 
the other. They are both traps that allow Franz and Karl nowhere to go but to 
death (Hammer, Schiller’s Wound 31). As Hammer highlights, this unrelenting 
grimness of the fictional world of The Robbers implicitly demands that  
we reinvent ourselves ethically, politically and generically despite the fact  
that such a reinvention proves possible for none of the characters (Schiller’s 
Wound 108). 
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Although Hart believes that if The Robbers does not propose an alternative 
to the system it criticizes, it is, first and foremost, because the play does not 
recognize punishment (that is to say, the state’s penal arsenal) as being 
inherently related to crime or its prevention (67). We think that it is due to its 
essentially critical character that does not intend to construct anything but to 
criticize harshly and expose the irrationality and injustice of the socio-political 
order. Schiller develops a strong critique of the difficulties involved in the 
application of the enlightened educative project to reality: its destructive 
potential and the possibility of becoming a fanatic of the freedom. 
While Schiller’s work poses a very powerful and radically concrete critique 
of the socio-political system of his age and of civil evil, it is, at the same time, 
unable to propose a feasible solution. The problem is the inherent idealism of the 
play, an idealism that, according to Terry Eagleton, is symptomatic of aesthetic 
critique: 
 
Aesthetics are not only incipiently materialist, they also provide, at the very heart of the 
Enlightenment, the most powerful available critique of bourgeois possessive individualism 
and appetitive egoism. . . . The aesthetic may be the language of political hegemony and an 
imaginary consolation for a bourgeoisie bereft of a home but it is also, in however idealist a 
vein, the discourse of utopian critique of the bourgeois social order. (337) 
 
The play’s final evocation of humanity is as abstract and intangible as the 
slogans of the revolution, unable to become historically real (Villacañas 195). 
Finally, only morals could have saved the world from being a banal fortune 
game but the moral Karl eventually claims is completely abstract and unable to 
reconstitute order. 
Works Cited 
Beiser, Frederick. Schiller as Philosopher. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Print. 
Cadete, Teresa R. “System oder Labyrinth? Schillers Raumvorstellung und Zeitpoetik.” Revista de 
Filología Alemana 14 (2006): 57–65. Print. 
Dewhurst, Kenneth, and Nigel Reeves. Friedrich Schiller: Medicine, Psychology and Literature. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978. Print. 
Eagleton, Terry. The Ideology of Aesthetics. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005. Print. 
Hammer, Stephanie. Schiller’s Wound. The Theatre of Trauma from Crisis to Commodity. Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 2001. Print. 
---. The Sublime Crime. Fascination, Failure, and Form in Literature of the Enlightenment. 
Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1994. Print. 
Hart, Gail K. Friedrich Schiller. Crime, Aesthetics and the Poetics of Punishment. Newark: 
University of Delaware Press, 2005. Print. 
Kant, Immanuel. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. 1797. Stuttgart: Reclam Verlag, 1952. 
Print. 
Lucía Bodas Fernández 
 
54 
Macor, Laura Anna. Il giro fangoso dell’umana destinazione. Friedrich Schiller dall’illuminismo 
al criticismo. Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2008. Print. 
Oncina, Faustino. “La utopía estética de Schiller y las aporías de la República de las letras.” Seis 
poemas “filosóficos” y cuatro textos sobre la dramaturgia y la tragedia. Valencia: Museu 
Valencia de al Illustració i de la Modernitat, 2005. 61–73. Print. 
Reinhold, Aris. History of Political Thought in Germany from 1784 to 1815. London: Frank Cass, 
1965. Print. 
Schiller, Friedrich. “Ankündigung der Rheinischen Thalia.” Mannheim, 11 Nov. 1784. Seis 
poemas “filosóficos” y cuatro textos sobre la dramaturgia y la tragedia. Trans. Martín 
Zubiria and Josep Monter. Valencia: Museu Valencia de al Illustració i de la Modernitat, 
2005. 75–82. Print.  
---. Escritos de Filosofía de la Historia. Murcia: Servicio de publicaciones de la Universidad, 
1991. Print. 
---. Kallias; Cartas sorbe la educación estética del hombre. [Kallias; Die ästhetische Erziehung 
des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefe.] Trans. Jaime Feijoó and Jorge Seca. Bilingual ed. 
Barcelona: Anthropos, 1990. Print. 
---. Poesía filosófica. Trans. Daniel Innerarity. Bilingual ed. Madrid: Hiperión, 1994. Print. 
---. Die Räuber. Stuttgart: Reclam Verlag, 1956. Print. 
Villacañas Berlanga, José Luis. Tragedia y teodicea de la Historia: El destino de los ideales en 
Lessing y Schiller. Madrid: Visor, 1993. Print. 
